I
The central bulk of Nelson Goodman's influential Languages of Art is devoted to the problem of the identity of th"e work of art.(l] In chapter three Goodman first expounds his now famous distinction between autographic and allographic art. Works of autographic arts (e.g., painting^ sculpture, printmaking) are works whose exact duplication cannot guarantee authenticity, since their authenticity depends on having the requisite history of production (e.g., being painted by the requisite artist or printed from the requisite plate).
In such arts, "the distinction between original and forgery of it is significant". [2] In contrast, the identity and authenticity of works of allographic arts (e.g., music, literature, and drama) are defined not historically but notationally. The work's essential or constitutive properties are fully determined by a notation (score, text, or script), and authentic instances of the work can be produced at will through duplication of the notation or what it prescribes.
After a detailed study of the syntactic and semantic requirements for notation (in chapter four), Goodman proceeds (in the penultimate chapter five) to provide notational definitions of the identity of works of allographic art and to explain why work-identity in the autographic arts must be differently defined. Altogether, this amounts to probably the most rigorous and comprehensive theory of the work of art's identity that has ever been presented, and not surprisingly it has been widely studied and discussed.
However, Goodman's theory of work-identity has been severely criticized.
[3] The sharp distinction between autographic and allographic art has sometimes been questioned, but probably most criticism has been directed at his rigidly precise notational definitions of the identity of allographic works, definitions which seem harshly inconsistent with common sense and ordinary critical practice. In this paper I shall not go into these familiar lines of criticism, though I should at least note in passing that the latter has considerable merit and power. My purpose here is rather to suggest an altogether different sort of problem and to criticize Goodman's theory of work-identity not for errors it has committed but for a troubling omission. I shall maintain that Goodman's theory suffers from the omission of a nominalistic formulation of his definitions of work-identity. This omission has serious ramifications, since it leaves such important issues as the work of art's ontological status and the relationship of an authentic instance of the work to the work itself uncomfortably unanswered. Moreover, anyone familiar with Goodman's radical and passionate nominalism cannot help but feel uneasy with the exceedingly platonistic definitions of the works of the various arts that he proposes in Languages of Art. Let us first consider these definitions.
II
Goodman recognizes that in most arts (not only the allographic arts but even the autographic arts of printmaking and cast sculpture) the work of art has or at least can have a multiple identity. In other words, in most cases the work admits of more than one authentic instance; more than one object or event (performance) can be an authentic example of one and the same work of art. What, then, is the work itself which admits of many authentic instances?
Goodman's surprising answer is that the work of art itself is simply the class of authentic instances of the work. Regarding the autographic arts, Goodman asserts that "in the case of painting, a work is ... In short, Goodman defines and identifies the work of art as a class. Even the unique, singular work of painting is described as a "unit class". Defining the work of art as a class may seem innocent enough; but when this is done by a radical nominalist like Goodman, who denies the existence of classes, properties, and universals of any sort, it seems like criminal platonism.
[9] Goodman's nominalism will recognize no entities other than individuals, and in Languages of Art he condemns talk of properties as "shameless platonism", "pampering prejudice", and "pussy-footing". [10] Goodman's other writings reveal that his nominalism is just as intolerant with respect to classes: "Nominalism for me consists specifically in the refusal to recognize classes." [11] Thus, for Goodman, talk of classes is "informal parlance admissible only because it can readily be translated into a more acceptable language",[12] viz., a nominalistic one.
However, in Languages of Art Goodman offers no such translation of his platonistic definitions of the works of the various arts; and without a nominalistic formulation of these definitions his theory seems painfully incomplete.
How indeed is it to be completed? Since Goodman has never provided a nominalistic translation of his definitions, we must now warily attempt to project one that would be acceptable to him and adequate for aesthetic theory. Another nominalistic device available to Goodman is to treat the name of the work of art, e.g., 'Hamlet', not as a proper name denoting a single individual but rather as a term with multiple denotation.
There is not one individual denoted by the name 'Hamlet' but many individuals. Thus, there is, in a sense, not one work of art, Hamlet, but many works of art or more simply many aesthetic objects and events which are labelled or denoted by the name 'Hamlet'. By this nominalistic view, the statement 'This is an authentic instance of Hamlet' should be translated as 'The label "Hamlet" can be correctly applied to this object or event', or alternatively as 'This object or event complies with the term "Hamlet"• Similarly, the statement 'Shakespeare is the author of Hamlet' could be translated into something like 'Shakespeare is the author of the first object/event properly labelled "Hamlet"'• Finally, statements like 'Hamlet is a tragic work' might be translated into statements like 'Those objects/events which most deserve to be labelled "Hamlet" are tragic' or 'If x is an object/event which is paradigmatic for the application of "Hamlet", then x is exceedingly likely to be (or must be) tragic'.
Thus, according to this brand of nominalism, 'Hamlet' does not name a unique, individual entity, be it a class or type, which is exemplified at different times and different places by the many different performances and texts which we recognize as instances of Hamlet.
Instead 'Hamlet' is seen as a label or predicate which fits many aesthetic objects and events. Therefore, in a sense, the work of art, Hamlet, does not really exist, but in its place remain the many artistic products-texts, performances, records, films -which are correctly labelled 'Hamlet'. A performance of Hamlet or a text of Hamlet is thus not a performance or a text of something (e.g., a type or class) existing above and beyond the performance or text; and therefore the nominalist might prefer to speak more perspicuously here of Hamlet-performances and Hamlet-texts instead of performances and texts of Hamlet.
This nominalistic view of the work of art, though eminently frugal, seems remote from the spirit of Goodman's theory of work-identity with its extended effort to supply a 'real definition' of the individual allographic work of art that is exemplified in its many authentic instances.
Surely in undertaking such a labour, Goodman seems to believe that some such individual-the work-exists to be defined.
Nor is there any hint in Languages of Art that there exists no such entity as Hamlet that is exemplified by its authentic instances, and that instead there are merely Hamlet-instances exemplifying the label 'Hamlet'. Thus, it seems unlikely that Goodman would accept this nominalistic view of the work of art, where the work dissolves into a range of instances with a common label. However, this view that the work of art is the superindividual composed of the sum of all its actual instances is a view which presents some puzzling problems. For by this view, each unabridged copy of Paradise Lost is but a fraction of the work, Paradise Lost, which is the sum total of all the copies and utterances of this work. Thus, one could probably never read the entire work, for indeed the work grows longer and longer with every copy printed. Similarly, in music, a complete performance of a genuine score of Beethoven's Eroica would be but a minute fraction of this work, if the work were identified with the sum of all such actual authentic performances. Here too the work would grow with every performance, and we would seem unable to hear the entire work. But surely we should not alter our conceptions of hearing a symphony and reading a poem just to conform to this new-fangled ontology of art. Goodman might argue that these objectionable consequences come only from playing with words and intentionally ignoring that hearing a (complete) symphony or reading a (complete) poem are elliptical for hearing a (complete) performance or reading a (complete) copy of the given work. However, many aestheticians would assert that the ellipsis is justified and significant, the point being that in confronting a complete performance or copy of a work we can also confront and experience the entire work itself, because the work itself can be said to be in a particular instance.
IV
For this reason it is often argued that the work of art is a type or universal, rather than a mere class or superindividual whose relation to its constituent elements is not so intimate or intrinsic. 
